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## LXVIII.

When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished.

## LXIX.

This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the liberation of soul, wherein the origin, duration, and termination of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the mighty saint.

## LXX.

This great purifying (doctrine) the sage compassionately imparted to A/SURI, A/SURI

taught it to PANCHASTIKHA, by whom it was extensively propagated.

## LXXI.

Received by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in *A'rya* metre by the piously disposed I/SAWARA KRISHNA, having thoroughly investigated demonstrated truth.

## LXXII.

The subjects which are treated in seventy couplets are those of the whole science, comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversial questions.

## HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT.

[Translated from the German of G. W. F. HEGEL.]

[All marks of subdivision included in brackets [ ] are not in the original, but are employed here to facilitate reference to the portions taken up in the commentary which follows. Adjectives and participles used substantively are sometimes capitalized to prevent confusion.—Ed.]

### A.—CONSCIOUSNESS.

#### III.

*Force and Understanding — The Phenomenal and the Supersensuous World.*

[p. 97.] [a] In the dialectic of sensuous certitude, consciousness has completely lost the senses — hearing, seeing, &c. — and as perception it has arrived at *thoughts*, which however it as yet only brings together in the unconditioned Universal. This Unconditioned would now itself again be nothing else than the one-sided extreme of *being-for-itself*, if it were taken as quiescent simple essence, for thus the no-essence (disorder) would stand in opposition to it; but related to the latter, the former would be unessential itself, and the consciousness would never come out of the deception of perception: it has, however, adduced itself as a somewhat which has gone out of such a conditioned being-for-itself back into itself. — This unconditioned Universal, which is now the true object of consciousness, is still as *object* of the same; it has not as yet apprehended its comprehension as *comprehension*. The two procedures should be carefully distinguished; consciousness has experienced that the object has gone back out of the relation to

another into itself, and has thus become *in itself* comprehension; but the consciousness is not yet *for itself* the comprehension, and for this reason it does not recognize itself in that reflected object. *For us* this object has become in such a manner through the activity of consciousness, that the latter has intertwined itself in the becoming of the same, and the reflection is the same on both sides, or merely one. But since the consciousness in this activity had merely the objective essence, and not the consciousness as such for its content, the result is to be posited in an objective signification for it, and the consciousness still withdrawing from that which is become, the latter is to it, as objective, the essence.

[p. 98.] [b] Although with this the understanding has cancelled its own untruth and the untruth of the object; and what has become for it through this, is the comprehension of the True as the True *existent in itself*, which is not as yet comprehension, or which lacks as yet the being-for-itself of consciousness, and which the understanding, without knowing itself in it, lets alone. The latter pursues its road by itself, so that the consciousness has no part or portion in its free realization, but only looks on and ap-

prehends it purely. We have therefore at first to occupy its place, and we must be its comprehension which develops what is contained in the result; in relation to this developed object which offers itself to the consciousness as existent, it first becomes an apprehending consciousness for itself.

[c] The result was the unconditioned Universal, at first in the negative and abstract sense, that the consciousness negated and abstracted its one-sided concepts, and gave them up. But the result has the positive significance that in it the unity of the being *for itself* and the being *for others*, or the absolute antithesis, is posited immediately as the same essence. It seems at first to have reference only to the form of the moments as related to each other; but the being for itself and the being for others is just as well the *content* itself, since the antithesis can have, in its truth, no other nature than the one which has adduced itself in the result, that, namely, the content held as *true* in perception, does in point of fact belong only to the form, and dissolves itself in its unity. This content is at the same time universal; there can be no other content which would withdraw itself through its peculiar character—to go back into this unconditioned universality. Such a content would be some determined mode of being-for-itself and of relation to others. But *to be for itself*, and to relate in general to others, constitutes its nature and essence, whose truth is to be unconditioned universality; and the result is absolutely universal.

[p. 99.] [d] But since this unconditioned Universal is object for the consciousness, the distinction of form and content makes its appearance on it, and in the shape of *content* the moments appear at first to present themselves, on the one hand, as universal medium of many extant matters, and on the other, as *one* reflected into itself, wherein their independence is destroyed. The former is the dissolution of the independence of the thing, or the passivity which is a being for others; but the latter, the being for itself. It is to be seen how these moments adduce themselves in the unconditioned universality which constitutes their essence. It is first of all evident, that through the fact that they are merely in this [universality], they no longer lie asunder, but that they are essentially, in themselves, self-cancelling sides, and nothing but their transition into each other is posited.

[e] The one moment appears thus as the essence which has become one side of the antithesis, as universal medium, or as the extantness of independent matters. But the independence of these matters is nothing else than this medium; or this Universal is the multiplicity of such different Universals. But that the Universal is in unseparated unity with this multiplicity, means that these matters are each where the other is; they interpenetrate each other reciprocally, without however touching each other, since conversely the many distinguished [ones] are just as independent. With this there is at once, also, their pure porosity posited, or their being cancelled. This being-cancelled again, or the reduction of this diversity to the pure being-for-itself, is nothing else than the medium itself, and this again is the independence of the distinctions. Or the somewhat posited as independent pass immediately over into their unity, and their unity immediately into the unfolding, and the latter again back into the reduction. This movement, however, is what is called *force* [*Kraft*]: the one moment thereof, namely, it, as expansion of the independent matters in their being, is its utterance; [p. 100] but it as the vanished-being of the same, is the force held back from its utterance, or *force proper*. But, in the first place, the confined force must utter itself; and secondly, in the utterance it is just at well in-itself-existent force as it is in this being-in-itself, utterance. Thus while we retain both moments in their immediate unity, the understanding, to which the conception of force properly belongs, is the comprehension which supports the distinguished moments as distinguished; for in force itself they are maintained not to be distinguished; the distinction is hence merely in the thought. Or in the above there is merely the conception of force posited and not its reality. But in point of fact force is the unconditioned Universal which is for another what it is in itself, or which has the distinction in itself, for it is nothing else than the being for others. Hence, in order that the force may be in its truth, it must be let alone entirely by thought, and be posited as the substance of these distinctions, i. e. at one time, as this whole force remaining essentially in and for itself, and then again its distinctions as substantial, or as for-themselves-subsisting moments. Hence the force, as such, or as confined, is for itself as an ex-

cluding one, for which the unfolding of the matters is another extant essence, and thus there are two distinct, independent sides posited. But the force is also the Whole, or it remains what it is, according to its comprehension; namely, these distinctions remain pure forms, superficially vanishing moments. The distinctions of the proper force confined in itself, and of the unfolding of the independent matters, would not be at all if they did not have extantness, or the force would not be if it did not *exist* in this antithesis; but that it exists in this antithesis, means nothing else than that both moments are at the same independent. [p. 101.] This activity of the two moments rendering themselves continually independent and again cancelling themselves, is that which is to be considered. It is obvious, in general, that this movement is nothing else than the activity of perception, in which the two sides, the Perceiving and Perceived, are at the same time first as the apprehension of the True, one and undistinguished; but, secondly, each side is just as well reflected into itself or for itself. Here these two sides are moments of force: they are in one unity, and this unity, which appears as middle in contradistinction to the extremes which are for themselves, always redissolves itself precisely into the extremes which are first through this. The activity which adduced itself previously as the self-destruction of the contradictory comprehensions, has here therefore the objective form and is the activity of force, as the result of which the unconditioned Universal makes its appearance as non-objective or as the internal of things.

[f] The force is, as it has been determined while it is represented as such or as reflected into itself, the one side of its comprehension; but as an extreme, rendered substantial, and that, too, posited under the determinateness of the one. Through this the extantness of the developed matters is excluded from it, and another than it. Since it is necessary that it itself be this extantness, or that it should utter itself, this utterance represents itself in this manner that the mentioned other comes to it and solicits it. But in point of fact, since it necessarily utters itself, that which was previously posited as another essence belongs to it itself. We must change the statement that it was posited as a one, and that its essence to utter itself was posited as another which came to it from without; it is rather itself this uni-

versal medium of the extantness of the moments, as matters; or it has uttered itself, and that which was to be the other soliciting somewhat is rather it itself. It therefore exists now as the medium of the unfolded matters. [p. 102.] But it has likewise essentially the form of the being-cancelled of the extant matters or it is essentially *one*; this one-being is thus, now that it is posited as the medium of matters, another than itself, and it has this, its essence, outside of itself. But since it must necessarily be this, as which it is not as yet posited, the other somewhat adds itself to it and solicits it to a reflection into itself, or cancels its utterance. In fact, however, it is itself this being-reflected-into-itself, the cancelled-being of the utterance; the one-being vanishes as it appeared, namely, as another; it (force) is thus therefore *itself*—it is force pressed back into itself.

[g] That which makes its appearance as other and solicits it as well to the utterance as to the return into itself, is, as at once adduces itself, force; for the other shows itself to be as well universal medium as One; and thus each of these shapes makes its appearance at the same time as vanishing moment. Hence force, through this, that another is for it, and that it is for another, has in general not as yet gone out of its comprehension. But there are at the same time two forces extant: the comprehension of the two is the same, but it is gone out of the unity into duality. Instead of the antithesis remaining merely essential moment throughout, it appears to have withdrawn itself through the duplication, into entirely independent powers, from the dominion of unity. The nature of this independence is now to be more closely investigated. At first, the second force makes its appearance as the soliciting, and that too as the Universal or general medium according to its content against the one which is determined as solicited; but since the former is essentially the interchange of these two moments and itself force, it is in point of fact also then first universal medium only when it becomes solicited to it, and just so moreover merely negative unity, or a soliciting to the return of force through the fact that it is solicited. Thus also the distinction which seemed to exist between the two, that the one was the soliciting and the other the solicited, changes itself [p. 103] into the same exchange of determinatenesses with each other.

[*h*] The play of these two powers consists thus in this being-determined contrariwise, in their being for each other in this determination, and in the absolutely immediate confounding of the determinations—a transition through which alone these determinations are, in which the forces seem to adduce themselves as independent. The soliciting, for example, is posited as general medium, and in contradistinction to it the solicited as force confined; but the former is universal medium itself only through the fact that the other is confined force; or the latter is rather the soliciting for the former, and renders it first a medium. The former has merely through the other its determinateness, and is soliciting only in so far as it is solicited by the other to be soliciting; and it loses just as immediately this determinateness given to it; for this goes over to the other, or rather is already gone over to it; the foreign, that which solicits the force, adduces itself as general medium, but only through the fact that it has been solicited to it by the force; in other words, it posits it in this manner, and is rather itself essentially general medium; it posits the soliciting in this manner for the reason that this other determination is essential to it, i. e. for the reason that it is rather itself.

[*i*] For the completeness of the insight in the comprehension of this activity, it may be remarked, in addition, that the distinctions themselves adduce themselves in a twofold distinction, at one time as distinctions of the content when the one extreme is force reflected into itself, the other being medium of the matters; the other time as distinctions of form, when the one is soliciting, the other solicited—the former active, the latter passive. According to the distinction of the content they are in general, or for us, distinct; but according to the distinction of the form they are independent, and in their relation opposed and repellant towards each other. [p. 104.] So that the extremes, according to these two sides, are nothing in themselves; but these two sides, in which their distinguished essence is said to consist, are merely vanishing moments, are an immediate transition of each into the opposed one; *this* is the result for the consciousness in the observation of the activity of force. But for us there was, as already mentioned above, this additional, that in themselves the distinctions, as distinctions of content and of form, vanished;

and according to the side of form the active, soliciting, or the being for itself, was essentially the same as that which upon the side of content, was in itself confined force; and the passive, solicited, or the being for another, on the side of form, is the same as that which on the side of content exhibited itself as the universal medium of the many matters.

[*j*] From this it is obvious that the comprehension of force through its duplication into two powers becomes actual, and also how it becomes. These two forces exist as for-themselves-existing essences; but their existence is such an activity against each other, that their being is rather a pure-positing-being through another, i. e. that their being has rather the pure signification of vanishing. They are not as extremes which retain something permanent for themselves, and only send an external property against each other in the middle and in their contact; but what they are, they are only in this middle and in this contact. In it there is just as well, immediately, the being-confined, or the being-for-itself of force, as the utterance; the soliciting as well as the being solicited; hence these two moments not parcelled out into two independent extremes which offer themselves only one antithetic point, but their essence is at once this—to be each only through the other, and at the same time what each is thus through the other, to be it immediately no longer while it is. They have thus, in point of fact, no substances of their own which would support and preserve them. The comprehension of force preserves itself rather as the essence in its very actuality; the force as actual is only in the utterance, [p. 105] which is at the same time nothing else than the cancelling of itself. This actual force represented as free from its utterance, and as existent for itself, is the confined force; but this determinateness is in point of fact, as it has adduced itself, merely a moment of the utterance. The truth of force, therefore, remains merely the thought thereof; and the moments of its actuality hurl resistlessly its substance and activity together into an indistinct unity, which is not the force confined in itself (for the latter is itself merely such a moment), but this unity is its comprehension as comprehension. The realization of force is at the same time the loss of reality; it has rather become an entirely Different; namely, this universality which

the understanding recognized at first as its essence, and which also proves itself as its essence in its maintained reality on the actual substance.

[k] In so far as we regard the first Universal as the concept of the understanding in which the force is not as yet for itself, the second is now its essence as it adduces itself in and for itself. Or, conversely, if we consider the first Universal as the Immediate which was to be an actual object for the consciousness, then the second is determined as the negative of the sensuously objective force; it is *it* as it is in its true essence merely as object of the understanding; the mentioned first would be the in-itself-confined force, or it as substance; but this second is the internal of things as the internality, which is identical with the comprehension as comprehension.

[l] This true essence of things has now determined itself thus: that it is not immediately for the consciousness, but that the latter has an immediate relation to the internal, and as understanding it looks through this middle of the play of forces into the true background of things. [p. 106.] The middle which unites the two extremes, the understanding and the internal, is the developed being of force, which is now for the understanding itself a vanishing. It is therefore called phenomenon; that being we call an appearance, which is in itself immediately a *not-being*. But it is not only an *appearance*, but a phenomenon, a *totality* of appearance. This totality as totality or Universal is that which constitutes the Internal, the play of forces, as reflection of the same into itself. In it the essences of perception are posited for the consciousness in an objective manner, as they are in themselves; namely, as moments which change themselves immediately into their opposites, without rest or being, the *one* immediately into the *Universal*, the Essential immediately into the Unessential, and *vice versa*. This play of forces is therefore the developed negative; but the truth thereof is the positive, namely, the Universal, the in-itself-existing object. The being of the same for the consciousness is mediated through the activity of the *appearance*, in which the being of perception and the sensuously objective in general has merely negative signification, hence out of which the consciousness reflects itself into itself as into the True; but as consciousness makes again this True to an objective Inter-

nal and distinguishes this reflection of things from its reflection into itself, just as the mediating activity is for it an objective one. This Internal, therefore, is for it an extreme in contradistinction to it; but it is for it the True, for the reason that in it, as in the *in-itself*, it has at the same time the certitude of itself, or the moment of its being for itself; but it is not as yet conscious of this ground, for the being for itself, which the Internal was to have in itself, would be nothing but the negative activity; but this is as yet for the consciousness the objective vanishing phenomenon, and not as yet its *own* being for itself; hence, although the Internal is for it comprehension, it does not as yet know the nature of the comprehension.

[p. 107.] [m] In this internally True as the absolute Universal, which has become purified from the antithesis of the Universal and the Individual, and become for the understanding, in the first place opens up for itself a Supersensuous as the true world beyond the sensuous, as the phenomenal world beyond the vanishing *this-side*, as an abiding Beyond; a being in itself which is the first, and therefore imperfect manifestation of reason, or which is merely the pure element wherein the True has its essence.

[n] Our object is therefore now the syllogism, which has for its extremes the Internal of things and the understanding, and for its middle the phenomenon; but the moment of this syllogism adduces the further determination of that which the understanding sees through the middle in the Internal of things and the experience, which it makes with reference to this relation of the being-united.

[o] The Internal is as yet pure Beyond for the consciousness, for it does not as yet find itself in it; it is empty, for it is merely the nothing of the phenomenon, and positively the simple Universal. This mode of being of the Internal is that spoken of by those who say that the Internal of things is not to be known; but a different reason would have to be assigned for this. Of this Internal, as it here immediately is, there is of course, no knowledge extant; but not because reason is too short-sighted or limited, or whatever it may be called (of which nothing is as yet known, for we have not as yet entered so deeply into the subject), but in consequence of the simple nature of the subject-matter itself, for there is nothing in the void to be known nor anything to be

said concerning the other side, for the simple reason that it is determined as the *Beyond* of consciousness. The result, of course, is the same, if a blind man looks into the wealth of the supersensuous world (if it has any, whether it be the peculiar content of the same, or whether consciousness itself be this content), [p. 108] and if a seeing one looks into the pure darkness, or into the pure light by itself, the seeing one sees as little in his pure light as in his pure darkness, and just as much as the blind man in the fulness of wealth which lies before him. If there were nothing else in the Internal, and in the being-united with it through the phenomenon, there would remain nothing for us but to hold fast to phenomenon—i. e. to take something as true which we know to be untrue—in order that there might be in this vacuity, which merely resulted as the vacuity of objective things, but must as vacuity in itself be also taken as void of all spiritual relations and of the distinctions of consciousness as consciousness. In order, therefore, that there be something in this entire void, which is also called the *Holy*, it would be better to fill it up with dreams, phenomena which the consciousness begets for itself. It would not deserve anything better than this, since even dreams themselves are better than this absolute vacuity.

[p.] But the Internal or the supersensuous Beyond has become, it results from experience, and it is its mediation; or the phenomenon is its essence, and in point of fact that which fills it up. The Supersensuous is the Sensuous and the Perceived posited as it is in truth; but the truth of the Sensuous and the Perceived is to be phenomenon. The Supersensuous is, therefore, phenomenon as phenomenon. If it is understood by this that the Supersensuous is the sensuous world, or the world as it is, for the immediate sensuous certitude and perception, this is a misunderstanding; for the phenomenon is not the world of sensuous knowing and perception as existent, but *it*, posited as cancelled, or in truth as internal. It is commonly said that the Supersensuous is *not* the phenomenal; [p. 109] but by this expression is understood not the phenomenon, but rather the sensuous world as itself real actuality.

[q.] The understanding, which is our object, finds itself precisely in this place, that the Internal has resulted for it merely, first as the Universal still undeveloped in itself;

the play of forces has precisely this negative signification: to be not in itself and merely this positive—to be the Mediating, but the External to the understanding. Its relation to the Internal, however, through the mediation, is its activity, through which it will obtain a content. The play of forces is for it immediately; but the True for it is the simple Internal; the activity of force is hence merely as simple in general, the True. But we have seen that this play of forces possesses this characteristic, that the force which is solicited by another force is likewise the soliciting for this other force which itself first becomes soliciting through this. There is in this, likewise, merely the immediate exchange or the absolute barter of the determinateness, which constitutes the only content of that which adduces itself, either to be universal medium or negative unity. In its definite appearance it immediately ceases to be that as which it appears; it solicits through its definite appearance the other side, which utters itself through this; i. e. the latter is immediately now that which the first was to be. These two sides, the relation of solicitation and the relation of the definite opposed content are, each for itself, the absolute inversion and exchanging. But these two relations are themselves again the same, and the distinction of the form to be the Solicited and the Soliciting is the same as the distinction of the content, the solicited as such, namely, the passive medium; the Soliciting, on the contrary, the active, the negative unity, or the One. Through this, all distinction of particular forces, [p. 110] which were to be extant in this activity in contradistinction to each other in general, vanishes; for they rested alone upon the mentioned distinctions, and the distinction of forces falls likewise with the mentioned two, together in one. It is, therefore, neither the force nor the soliciting and being solicited, nor yet the determinateness to be subsisting medium and in-itself-reflected unity; it is neither somewhat singular by itself, nor yet are they different antitheses; but what there is in this absolute exchange is merely the distinction as a Universal, or as a One into which many antitheses have been reduced. This distinction, as universal, is therefore the Simple in the play of force itself and the True thereof; it is the *law* of force.

[r.] In the simple distinction, the absolutely exchanging phenomenon becomes

through its relation to the simplicity of the Internal or of the understanding. The Internal is at first the Universal in itself; but this in-itself-simple Universal, is essentially just as absolutely the universal distinction; for it is the result of the exchange itself, or the exchange is its essence; but the exchange as posited as the Internal, is taken up into the same, as it is in truth, hence just as absolute universal distinction which has become quiet and remains equal to itself. Or the negation is the essential moment of the Universal, and it or the mediation in the Universal is universal distinction. It is expressed in the law as the constant picture of the unstable phenomenon. The supersensuous world is thus a quiet realm of laws, although beyond the perceived world, for the latter only exhibits the law through a constant change, but yet just as well present in the same and its immediate quiescent picture.

[s] This realm of laws is the truth of the understanding which has for its content the distinction in the law; but it is at the same time only its first truth, and does not fill up the phenomenon. [P. 111.] The law is present in it, but it is not its entire presence; it (the law) is always under different circumstances a different actuality. Through this remains a side to the phenomenon for itself, which is not in the Internal; or it is not as yet in truth posited as phenomenon, as cancelled being for itself. This defect in the law must also adduce itself, on it (the law). That which appears to be its defect consists in this: that although it has the distinction in it itself, yet it has it as a general One, as an undetermined One. But in so far as it is not *the law* in general but *a law*, it has the determinateness in it; and with this there are an indefinite number of laws extant. This multiplicity is itself, however, rather a defect; it contradicts rather the principle of the understanding, for which, as the consciousness of the simple Internal, the in-itself-universal unity is the True. Hence it has rather to reduce the many laws into one law, as e. g., the law according to which the stone falls, and the law according to which the heavenly spheres move, have been comprehended as one law. But with this unifying, the laws lose their determinateness; the law becomes more and more superficial, and in this there is in point of fact discovered not the unity of these determined laws, but a law which leaves out

their determinateness; just as the one law which unites within itself the law of the fall of bodies on the earth and of the heavenly motions, does not in point of fact express them both. The uniting of all laws in the universal attraction expresses no content farther than precisely the mere comprehension of the law itself which is posited in it as existing. The universal attraction says only this, that everything has a constant distinction from others. The understanding thinks that it has found in this a universal law which expresses the general reality as such; but it has in point of fact merely found the comprehension of the law itself, yet in such a manner that it at the same time expresses this also, that all reality is in itself according to law. The expression [p. 112] of a universal attraction has, therefore, in this respect, great importance, since it is directed against the thoughtless representation for which everything offers itself in the form of contingency and for which the determinateness has the form of sensuous independence.

[t] Thus, therefore, the universal attraction or the pure comprehension of the law stands opposed to the definite law. In so far as this pure comprehension is considered as the essence or as the true Internal, the determinateness of the determined law belongs itself still to the phenomenon, or rather to the sensuous being. But the pure comprehension of law does not merely go beyond the law which, itself a determined one, stands opposed to other determined laws, but it goes even beyond the law as such. The determinateness of which we spoke is really itself a vanishing moment which cannot occur here any more as essential; for the law alone is here extant as the True; but the comprehension of the law is turned against the law itself. In the law, namely, the distinction is *immediately* apprehended and taken up into the Universal, but with this a subsistence of the moments, whose relation it expresses as indifferent and in-themselves-existing essences. But these parts of the distinction in the law are at the same time determined sides; the pure comprehension of law as universal attraction, must be apprehended in its true significance as follows: that in it as the absolute Simple, the distinctions which are contained in the law as such, go themselves back again into the Internal as simple unity; it is the internal necessity of the law.

[u] The law is through this extant in a

twofold manner; first, as the law on which the distinctions are expressed as independent moments; secondly, in the form of the simple being gone-back-into-itself, which may again be called force, but in such a manner that it is not the confined [p. 113] force, but force in general, or as the comprehension of force, an abstraction which draws within itself the distinctions of that which attracts and is attracted. Thus, for example, simple electricity is force; the expression of the distinction, however, falls into the law; this distinction is positive [p. 113] and negative electricity. In the movement of a falling body the force is the simple gravity—which has the law that the magnitudes of the different moments of the movement (the times and spaces passed over) stand in the ratio to each other of the root to its square. Electricity itself is not a distinction in itself or in its essence the twofold existence of positive and negative electricity; for which reason it is customary to say that it is its law to be in this manner, also that it has the property to manifest itself thus. This property, of course, is the essential and peculiar property of this force; or it is necessary to it. But necessity is here an empty word; the force must, precisely *because* it must, dualize itself. Of course, if positive electricity is posited, the negative is in itself also necessary; for the positive is merely a relation to a negative, or the positive is *in itself* the distinction from itself just as likewise the negative is. But that electricity thus divides itself, this is not in itself the necessary; it as simple force is indifferent towards its law to be as positive and negative; and if we call the former its comprehension and the latter its being, then its comprehension is indifferent towards its being; it possesses merely this property; i. e. precisely, it is not in itself necessary. This indifference takes another shape when it is said that it belongs to the *definition* of electricity to be positive and negative, or that this is absolutely its comprehension and essence. In that case its being would be called *its existence* in general; but in the former definition there lies not the necessity of its existence; it is either because [p. 114] one finds it, i. e. it is not necessary at all; or its existence is in consequence of other forces, i. e. its necessity is an external one. But through this that the necessity is laid in the determinateness of being through others we fall again back into

the multiplicity of definite laws, which we just now left behind us in order to consider the law as law; only with the latter is its comprehension as comprehension, or its necessity, to be compared, but which has in all these forms shown itself only as an empty word.

[v] The indifference of law and of force, or of comprehension and of being, is extant in still another form than the one adduced. In the law of motion, e. g. it is necessary that the movement separate into time and space, i. e. into distance and rapidity. Since motion is merely the relation of these moments, it is most assuredly the Universal, here considered in itself separated; now, however, these parts, time and space, or distance and rapidity, do not express in themselves this origin from One; they are indifferent towards each other; space is represented as possible without time, time without space, and distance at least as possible without rapidity; so likewise it is represented that their magnitudes are indifferent towards each other, since they do not stand in relation as positive and negative, hence do not relate essentially to each other. Thus, also, the necessity of the division is here extant, but not the necessity of the parts for each other. For this reason, however, the first necessity itself is merely a false seeming necessity; the movement itself, namely, is not represented as simple or as pure essence, but as already sundered; time and space are its independent parts or essences in themselves, or distance and rapidity are modes of being or representation, one of which may very well be without the other, and the movement is therefore merely their superficial relation and not their essence. Represented as simple essence [p. 115] or as force, it is gravity, which, however, does not contain these distinctions in general within it.

[w] The distinction is, therefore, in both cases no distinction in itself; either the Universal, the force is indifferent towards the separation which is in the law, or the distinctions, the parts of the law, are indifferent towards each other. But the understanding has the comprehension of this distinction in itself, precisely in the fact that the law is partly the Internal, the in-itself-existent, but is in it at the same time distinguished; that this distinction is thus internal distinction is involved in the fact that the law is simple force, or as comprehension thereof, hence a distinction of the

comprehension. But this internal distinction falls, as yet, still in the Understanding and is not as yet posited in the object itself (*Sache selbst*). It is thus merely a necessity of its own making, that the understanding expresses; a distinction which it makes in such a way that it expresses at the same time that the distinction is no distinction of the object itself. This necessity, which is merely in the word, is thus the repetition of the moments which constituted the circle thereof; although they are distinguished, yet their distinction is at the same time expressed as no distinction of the object itself, and therefore is itself cancelled again; this movement is called "explaining" (*erklären*). Thus a law is enunciated; from this its in-itself-universal, or the ground, is distinguished as the force; but this distinction is said to be none, but that the ground is entirely of the same nature as the law. The individual occurrence of lightning, for example, is apprehended as a Universal, and this Universal is expressed as the law of electricity: explanation then reduces the law to the force as the essence of the law; this force is of such a nature that if it manifests itself, there occur opposite electricities, which again vanish in each other, i. e. the force is just of the same nature as the law; it is said that the two are not at all distinguished. The distinctions are the pure [p. 116] universal manifestation, or the law and the pure force; but both have the same content, the same nature; the distinction as distinction of the content, i. e. of the object (*Sache*), is likewise again taken back.

[x] The understanding continues this tautological activity, as is obvious, while the object remains a quiescent unity, and the activity falls only within the former, and not in the object; it is an explaining which not merely explains nothing, but it is clear that although it makes preparations to say something different from what has already been said, yet it says nothing new, but only repeats the same. In the object itself, nothing further originates through this activity, but it comes into consideration only as an activity of the understanding. In it, however, we now recognize precisely that which was missed in the law, namely: the absolute change itself; for this activity, if we consider it closely, is precisely the opposite of itself. It posits, namely, a distinction, which is not merely no distinction for us, but which it itself cancels as distinction.

This is the same interchange which adduces itself as the play of forces; in it there was the distinction of the solicited and the being-solicited, of the force which manifested itself and which was confined; but they were distinctions which in truth were none, and thus were immediately cancelled again. The mere unity is not only extant, so that no distinctions were posited, but it is this activity that of course has made a distinction; but since it is none, it is again cancelled. With the explaining, therefore, the procedure and change which was previously outside of the Internal, and merely in the phenomenon itself, has now penetrated into the Supersensuous itself; but our consciousness has now gone out of the Internal as object, over to the other side into the Understanding, and has in it the interchange.

[y] This interchange is therefore not as yet an interchange in the object itself, but reduces itself rather as a pure interchange, [p. 117] precisely through the fact that the content of the moments of the interchange remain the same. But since the comprehension as comprehension of the Understanding is the same as the Internal of things, this interchange becomes the law of the Internal for it (the understanding). It experiences therefore, that it is the law of the phenomenon itself, that distinctions become which are no distinctions; or that the Homonymous (*das Gleichnamige*) repels itself from itself, and likewise that the distinctions are of such a kind as in truth are none, and which cancel themselves; or that the Heteronymous attracts itself; a second law, whose content is opposed to that which was previously called law, namely, the distinction which remained like itself continually; for this new law expresses rather the becoming unlike of the like, and the becoming like of the unlike. Comprehension requires of thoughtlessness that it bring both laws together and become conscious of their antithesis. The second is a law, it is true, or an internal self-identical being, but a self-identity of the unlikeness rather, a constant inconstancy. On the play of forces, this law adduced itself as precisely this absolute transition and as pure interchange; the Homonymous, the force, dirempts itself into an antithesis, which appears at first as an independent distinction, but which proves itself to be, in point of fact, no distinction; for it is the Homonymous which repels itself from

itself, and that which is repelled therefore attracts itself essentially, for it is the same; the distinction made, since it is none, therefore cancels itself again. It adduces itself therefore as distinction of the object itself, or as absolute distinction, and this distinction is hence nothing else than the Homonymous which has repelled itself from itself, and therefore posits only an antithesis which is no antithesis.

[z] Through this principle the first supersensuous, the quiet empire of laws, the immediate picture of the perceived world is transformed into its opposite; the law, as well as its distinctions, [p. 118] was that which remained constantly like itself; but now there is posited that each is rather the opposite of itself; that which is like itself repels itself rather from itself, and that which is unlike posits itself rather as like. In point of fact, the distinction is only with this determination, the internal one, or distinction in itself, since the like is unlike itself, and the unlike is like itself. This second supersensuous world is in this manner the inverted world; and that, too, since the one side is extant already on the first supersensuous world, the inverted one of this first world. The Internal is through this, completed as phenomenon. For the first supersensuous world was merely the immediate elevation of the perceived world into the universal element; it had its necessary counterpart in the latter, which still retained for itself the principle of change and mutation; the first realm of laws lacked this, but it retains it as inverted world.

[aa] According to the law of this inverted world, therefore, the Homonymous of the first is the unlike of itself, and the unlike of the same is in the same manner like to itself, or it becomes like to itself. In definite moments this will adduce itself as follows: that which in the law of the first world is sweet, will, in this inverted (world) be in itself sour; what in the first was black, will in this be white. What, in the law of the first, is the north pole to a magnet, is in its other supersensuous, being-in-itself (in the earth, namely), south pole; but what is there south pole, is here north pole. Likewise what in the first law of electricity is oxygen-pole, will be in its other supersensuous essence the hydrogen-pole; and conversely, what is there the hydrogen-pole will be here the oxygen-pole. In another sphere, that which according to the immediate law,

is revenge on an enemy, is the highest satisfaction of the injured individuality. But this law, to show myself as an essence to him, who does not treat me as self-essence, and rather to cancel him, as an essence, changes itself through the principle of the other world [p. 119] into the opposite, viz., re-establishment of myself as essence, through the cancelling of the foreign essence in self-destruction. Now if this inversion, which is exhibited in the punishment of vice, is made the law, then it again is also merely the law of a world which has an inverted supersensuous world over against it, in which what is despised in the former is honored, and what is honored in the former is despised. The punishment which, according to the law of the first world, annihilates and puts man to shame, changes itself in its inverted world into the pardon which preserves his essence and elevates him to honor.

[bb] Superficially regarded, this inverted world is thus the converse of the first, in such a manner that it has the same outside of it, and repels from itself the mentioned first as an inverted actuality; that the one is the phenomenon, but the other the Being-in-itself; the one is it as it is for others, the other on the contrary as it is for itself; so that, to use the previous examples, what tastes sweet, tastes *really* or internally in the thing, sour; or what on the real phenomenal magnet is north pole, would be on the inner or essential being, south pole; what makes its appearance on the manifested electricity as oxygen-pole, would be on the non-manifested electricity the hydrogen-pole. Or an action which is transgression in *appearance*, might be internally really good (a bad action, having a good motive); punishment, merely punishment in appearance, but in another world a blessing for the transgressor. Such antitheses, however, of internal and external, of appearance and the Supersensuous, as of two different kinds of actualities, are here no longer extant. The repelled distinctions do not divide themselves again into two substances, which would support them and furnish them a separate subsistence, through which the understanding would again fall back out of the Internal to its former place. The one side or substance would again be the world of perception in which the one of the two laws would perform its function, and opposed to that world there would be an internal

world, just such a sensuous world as the first, but *in imagination*; it could not be shown as a sensuous, could not be seen, heard, tasted, and yet it would be conceived as such a sensuous world. But in point of fact if the one posited is a Perceived, and its being-in-itself, as the converse thereof, is just such a sensuously represented somewhat, then the sour which was to be the *in-itself* of the sweet thing, is just as real a thing as it, a sour thing; the black which would be the in-itself of the white, is the real black; the north pole, which would be the in-itself of the south pole, is the north pole extant on the same magnet; the oxygen-pole which is the *in-itself* of the hydrogen-pole, is the extant oxygen-pole of the same battery. The real transgression has its inversion, and its in-itself as possibility in the motive as such, but not in a good one; for the truth of the motive is only the act itself. The transgression, according to its content, has its reflection into itself, or its inversion in the real punishment; this is the reconciliation of the law with the actuality opposed to it in the transgression. The real punishment finally has its inverted reality in that it is a realization of the law, through which the activity which it has as punishment cancels itself; that it becomes out of the Active again quiet and valid law, and the activity of the individuality against it, and of it against individuality, is extinguished.

[cc] Out of the conception of inversion, which constitutes the essence of one side of the supersensuous world, the sensuous conception of the rendering permanent of the distinctions in a different element of subsistence is therefore to be removed, and this absolute comprehension of the distinctions is to be apprehended as internal distinction, [p. 121] repulsion from itself of the Homonymous as Homonymous, and to be exhibited and apprehended as the identity of the Unequal as Unequal. The pure change or the opposition in itself, the contradiction, is to be thought. For in the distinction which is an internal one, the opposed is not merely one of two; otherwise it would be an Existent and not an Opposed; but it is the Opposed of an Opposed, or the other is in it immediately extant. Although I may place the opposite in this place, and the other, or that of which it is the opposite, in that place—thus the opposite on one side, in and for itself, without

the other—yet precisely for the reason that I have here the opposite in and for itself, I have the opposite of itself, or it is in point of fact the other immediately to itself. Thus the supersensuous world, which is the inverted one, has at the same time encroached upon the other and has it in itself; it is for itself the inverted, i. e. the inverted of itself; it is itself and its opposite in one unity. Only in this way is it the distinction as internal, or distinction in itself, or is as infinitude.

[dd] Through the infinitude we see the law completed in itself to necessity, and all the moments of phenomenality taken up into the Internal. The simplicity of the law is the infinitude, i. e. according to what has adduced itself, (α) it is a somewhat like to itself, which however is the distinction in itself; or it is the Homonymous which expels itself from itself, or which duplicates itself. That which was called *simple* force duplicates itself, and is through its infinitude the law. (β) The duplicated (dirempted) which constitutes the parts represented in the law, adduces itself as subsisting (somewhat); and if they are considered without the comprehension of the internal distinction, then space and time, or distance and velocity, which appear as moments of gravity, become as well indifferent and without necessity for each other, or for gravity itself, just [p. 122] as this simple gravity is then opposed to them, or simple electricity to the positive and negative. (γ) But through the comprehension of the internal distinction, this Unlike and Indifferent, space and time, etc., is a distinction which is no distinction, or only a distinction of the Homonymous, and its essence the unity; they are as positive and negative vitalized against each other; and their Being consists rather in this, to posit themselves as not-being and to cancel themselves in the unity. Both distinctions subsist; they are in themselves—they are in themselves as opposed, i. e. the opposite of themselves; they have their other in them and are merely one unity.

[ee] This simple infinitude, or the absolute comprehension, is to be called the simple essence of life, or the soul of the world, or the universal blood, which, everywhere present, is interrupted by no distinction nor troubled, which is itself rather all distinctions as well as their annulment, which pulsates within itself without moving itself, and which shudders within itself without becoming unquiet. It is self-identical, for the dis-

inctions are tautological; they are distinctions which are none. This essence, which is self-identical, relates itself therefore only to itself. To itself: thus that to which it relates itself is another, and this relation to itself is rather the diremption, or that self-identity is nothing but internal distinction. These dirempted (somewhats) are therefore in and for themselves each an opposite of another; thus in them the other is already expressed; or it is not the opposite of another but merely the *pure opposite*; thus it is, therefore, in itself the opposite of itself. Or it is in general not an opposite but purely for itself, a pure self-identical essence which has no distinction in it; thus we need not ask—much less need we regard the torment with such questions as Philosophy—or hold them for unanswerable—“*how the distinction or the other-being comes out of this pure essence*”; for [p. 123] the diremption has already occurred, the distinction is excluded from the self-identical and has been set aside; that which was intended to be the self-identical is therefore one of the dirempted somewhats instead of being the absolute essence. The self-identical dirempts itself, i. e. it cancels itself as already dirempted. It cancels itself as other-being. The unity, of which it is ordinarily said that the distinction cannot come out of it, is, in point of fact, itself merely one of the moments of the diremption; it is the abstraction of simplicity which is opposed to the distinction. But since it is the abstraction, merely one of the opposites, it is already said that it is the dirempting; for if the unity is a negative somewhat, an opposite, then it is posited precisely as that which has the opposition in it. The distinction of diremption and becoming self-identical is therefore precisely this activity of the self-cancelling; for while the self-identical, which should first become dirempted or its opposite, is an abstraction or already itself a Dirempted, its diremption is thus a cancelling of that which it is, and hence the cancelling of its being-dirempted. The becoming self-identical is likewise a dirempting; that which becomes self-identical enters into opposition to the diremption; i. e. it sets itself aside in this, or rather it becomes a Dirempted.

[f] The infinitude, or this absolute restlessness of the pure self-moving, that which is determined in any possible manner, as e. g., Being, is rather the opposite of this determinateness, and though it has been

already the soul of all that has preceded, yet in the internal it has first freely manifested itself. The phenomenon or the play of forces manifests it already, but as *explanation* it manifests itself freely; and when it finally becomes object for the consciousness, as that which it is, then is consciousness self-consciousness. The explanation—the activity of the understanding—makes first of all [p. 124] only the description of that which is self-consciousness. It cancels the distinctions which are contained in the law and have already become purified, but which still remain in different distinctions, and posits them in one unity—force. But this becoming-like is immediately a diremption; for it cancels the distinctions and posits the one of force only through this, that it makes a new distinction between law and force, but which at the same time is no distinction; and for the reason that this distinction is no distinction, it itself proceeds to the point that it cancels this distinction again, since it makes the force, of the same nature as the law. But this movement or necessity is thus still necessity and movement of the understanding, or it as such is not its object, but it (understanding) has for its object positive and negative electricity, distance and velocity, attractive force, and a thousand other things, which constitute the content of the moments of the activity. For this reason there is so much solid satisfaction in explaining; for the consciousness, so to speak, carries on an immediate monologue with itself, and enjoys only itself; it appears, indeed, to have to do with something entirely different, but in point of fact it has only to do with itself.

[gg] Although in the opposite law, or inversion of the first law, or in the internal distinction, the infinitude itself becomes object of the understanding, yet it (the understanding) misses it again as such, since it divides the distinction in itself—the repulsion of the Homonymous, and the Unlikes which attract, into two worlds, or into two substantial elements. The activity as it is in experience, is for it here an occurrence and the Homonymous and the Unlike are predicates, whose essence is an existent substratum. The same which is object for the understanding in the sensuous hull, is object for us in its essential form as pure comprehension. [p. 125] This apprehending of the distinction as it in truth is, or

the apprehending of the infinitude as such, is for us or in itself. The exposition of its comprehension belongs to science; but the consciousness, as it possesses this comprehension, immediately again makes its appearance as a proper form or new shape of consciousness which does not recognize in the preceding its essence, but takes it for something entirely different. Thus while this comprehension of infinitude is its object, it is thus consciousness of the distinction as a distinction which is just as much immediately cancelled; it is for itself the distinguishing of the Undistinguished, or self-consciousness. I distinguish myself from myself, and it is in this immediately for me that this Distinguished is not distinguished. I, the Homonymous, repel myself from myself; but this Distinguished, this which has been posited unlike, is immediately, while it is distinct, no distinction for me. The consciousness of another, of an object in general, is itself necessary self-consciousness, being reflected into itself, consciousness of itself in its other being. The necessary progress from the forms of consciousness hitherto considered, whose truth was a thing different from themselves, expresses precisely this: that not merely is the consciousness of a thing possible for self-consciousness, but that this latter alone is the truth of the mentioned forms. But this truth is only extant for us not as yet for the consciousness. The self-consciousness has first become for *itself*, not yet as unity with the consciousness in general.

We see that in the Internal of the phenomenon the understanding experiences in truth nothing else than the phenomenon itself, not, however, as it is the play of forces, but

the same in its absolute universal moments, and their activity, and in point of fact only itself. Elevated above Perception, consciousness manifests itself united with the supersensuous through the middle term of Phenomenon, through which it looks into this background.

[p. 126] The two extremes, the one the pure Internal, the other the Internal (understanding) which looks into this pure Internal, have become now identified, and they as extremes as well as the middle term, as something different from them, have vanished. This curtain has, therefore, been removed from before the Internal and the looking of the Internal into the Internal is extant; the looking of the undistinguished Homonymous which repels itself, posits itself as distinguished Internal, but for which, at the same time, the indistinguishableness of both immediately is—the self-consciousness. It is obvious that behind the so-called curtain which was to cover up the Internal, there is nothing to be seen if we do not ourselves go behind it, not only in order that something be seen, but that something be behind it which can be seen. But it is at the same time also obvious that it is impossible to go behind it without some ceremony, for this knowing what the truth of the conception of the phenomenon and its Internal is, is itself only the result of a fully developed activity through which the modes of consciousness, *opinion*, *perception*, and *understanding*, vanish; and it will also adduce itself that the recognition of that which the consciousness knows while it knows itself, requires still further detail, an exposition of which remains to be given.

## THE “SINFONÍA ERÓICA.”

[Read before the St. Louis Art Society, December, 1868, by CHS. L. BERNATS.]

The “*Sinfonía Eróica*” is the third symphony written by Beethoven, but the first in which the great *maestro* abandoned the old style of Haydn and Mozart, and where-in he followed exclusively—in matter and form—the inspirations of his own great genius. With this symphony Beethoven, in

fact, abandoned every particular style, and did not even establish a new one; but his full-grown genius henceforth objectified itself upon the various stages of its own development, and, without precisely intending to represent anything in particular, he revealed himself in his creations, leaving to the world